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Abstract—A securely maintained key is the premise upon
which data stored and transmitted by ubiquitously deployed
resource limited devices, such as those in the Internet of Things
(IoT), are protected. However, many of these devices lack a secure
non-volatile memory (NVM) for storing keys because of cost
constraints. Silicon physical unclonable functions (PUFs) offering
unique device specific secrets to electronic commodities are a
low-cost alternative to secure NVM. As a physical hardware
security primitive, reliability of a PUF is affected by thermal
noise and changes in environmental conditions; consequently,
PUF responses cannot be directly employed as cryptographic
keys. A fuzzy extractor can turn noisy PUF responses into
usable cryptographic keys. However, a fuzzy extractor is not
immediately mountable on (highly) resource constrained devices
due to its implementation overhead. We present a methodology
for constructing a lightweight and secure PUF key generator
for resource limited devices. In particular, we focus on PUFs
constructed from pervasively embedded SRAM in modern mi-
crocontroller units and use a batteryless computational radio
frequency identification (CRFID) device as a representative
resource constrained IoT device in a case study.
Index Terms—SRAM PUF, Reverse fuzzy extractor, Multiple
reference response, PUF key generator, Computational RFID
I. INTRODUCTION
Resource limited IoT (Internet of Things) devices provide
challenging environments for building privacy and security
preserving mechanisms. Although various cryptographic al-
gorithms can be engineered to address the aforementioned
challenges, all of these measures eventually rely on a se-
curely maintained key. Nowadays, digital keys are stored in
non-volatile memory (NVM) such as FLASH that is often
assigned externally to a computing platform. However, it has
been shown that securing digital key storage is non-trivial in
practice due to e.g., technical or cost limitations [1]. Silicon
physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [2], [3] provide an
alternative. PUFs can replace the functionality of the NVM
based keys while increasing the security level of cryptographic
key storage using standard CMOS technology based hardware
security primitives. Overall, silicon PUFs offer: i) low fabri-
cation costs [1]; ii) uniqueness (an inseparable fingerprint of
a hardware instance); and iii) enhanced resistance to attacks,
especially, invasive attacks [4]–[6].
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs): A PUF, in essence,
extracts secrets from inevitable process variations that is alike
device fingerprints [2], [8], [9]. Hence, in reality, identical PUF
instances cannot be forged, not even by the same manufacturer.
As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), a PUF can be abstracted as a
function where a given binary input (challenge c) applied to
different PUF instances produces differing instance-specific
binary outputs (responses r). According to the number of
challenge response pairs (CRPs) yielded, a PUF is generally
categorized into strong and weak PUF classes [10]. Generally,
a strong PUF yields CRPs exponential with respect to the size
of the challenge or area. Conversely, its counterpart, weak
PUF, yields limited number of CRPs—CRP space linearly
increases with the area or the size of the challenge. Elementary
PUF applications are: i) lightweight authentication; and ii) key
generation.
Lightweight Authentication: PUFs provide novel avenues
for realizing lightweight authentication mechanisms, usually
employing strong PUFs due to the infeasibility of fully
characterizing all its CRPs in a reasonable time frame by
an adversary [10]. In the PUF enrolment phase, the server
(verifier) lodges a number of CRPs into its database. In the au-
thentication phase when the PUF integrated device (prover) is
deployed in field, the server randomly picks up a challenge and
sends it to the prover. Once the prover returns the measured
response subject to the received challenge, the server com-
pares the enrolled response in the database with the returned
response from the prover. The authenticity of the prover is
established only if the Hamming distance between the received
and enrolled response is less than a predetermined threshold.
However, due to various model building attacks [11]–[14], it
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Fig. 1. (a) Queried by a challenge, the PUF produces an instance-specific
response. (b) SRAM PUF: Threshold voltage Vth mismatches of the transis-
tors determines the response [7]. For example, when the Vth,M1 is slightly
smaller than Vth,M2 , at power-up, the transistor M1 starts conducting before
M2, thus, A = ‘1’. This in turn prevents M2 switching on. As a consequence,
the SRAM power-up state prefers to be ‘1’ (A = ‘1’, B =‘0’), which is the
response, while the address is the challenge.c© 2019 IEEE. Permission from IEEE must be obtained except personal usage.
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is now recognized that it is hard to provide security guarantees
for simple challenge-response based lightweight authentication
protocols built upon silicon strong PUFs, specifically, variants
of the APUF [15] and k-sum ROPUF [16]. One method to
halt modeling attacks is to limit the exposed number of CRPs
by limiting the number of authentication rounds. The trade-
off is that the PUF has to be disposed once a predetermined
number of authentication rounds are reached [17]. A recent
examination of strong PUF based authentication mechanisms
concluded that a secure PUF based authentication mechanism
is better to be crafted from a PUF derived key [14], [18].
Consequently, we will focus on key generation with PUFs
and how secure key generation can be realized on resource
limited devices. A PUF based key derivation method has the
potential to provide resource limited devices a cost effective
authentication mechanism together with secure key storage.
Secure and Reliable Key Generation: Unlike strong PUF
responses that are usually correlated, weak PUF responses are
normally independent from each other where each response
is derived from an independent source of entropy. Conse-
quently, a weak PUF, in general, is inherently immune to
modeling attacks. Weak PUFs are highly suitable for deriv-
ing cryptographic keys. Recall that PUFs measure physical
circuit properties to generate responses and—like any phys-
ical measurement—are inevitably affected by thermal noise
and varying environmental conditions; hence, PUF response
reproductions are not completely stable [1]. Therefore, a
PUF based key generator utilizes a fuzzy extractor to turn
unstable responses into a stable and uniformly distributed
cryptographic key. PUF based key generators have been well
studied in the last decade, however, only small number of
studies provide a complete implementation. Among the full
implementations, majority are hardware implementations on
FPGA platforms [19], [20] rather than software implementa-
tions on microcontroller (MCU) platforms [21]. In fact, most
IoT devices do not have FPGAs but operate using MCUs.
Further, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one
end-to-end software PUF key generator implementation on
a low power computing platform in the form of a highly
resource constrained and batteryless device that relies only
on harvested RF energy for operations [22].Therefore, we
aim to provide a simple and timely guide to the Ubiquitous
Computing community for realizing PUF based key generators
to benefit from their inherent key security. In particular:
• We consider the use of freely available SRAM on low
cost and low power MCUs to function as an intrinsic
PUF to derive a secure and reliable cryptographic key.
• We consider a methodology for realizing lightweight
implementations of reliable key generators capable of ex-
ecution on low cost and ultra low power microcontrollers.
II. ANATOMY OF A KEY GENERATOR
A. SRAM PUF
SRAM memory is pervasively embedded within electronic
commodities. When SRAM is powered up, each SRAM cell
has a favored power-up state; see Fig. 1(b). Such a favored
power-up state varies from cell to cell, and chip to chip. There-
fore, the power-up pattern of SRAM memory can be treated
as a PUF where the address of each cell is a challenge and
power-up state the response. Thus SRAM yields an intrinsic
PUF attributing to its wide scale availability on MCUs and its
ability to be used without any overhead—extra hardware [7];
this makes SRAM PUFs a popular silicon PUFs nowadays.
B. (Reverse) Fuzzy Extractor
To turn the raw noisy PUF responses—for example, from
an SRAM PUF—into a cryptographic key, a widely accepted
approach is to employ a fuzzy extractor [20], [23], [24]—see
the illustration in Fig. 2. A fuzzy extractor consists of: i) a
secure sketch; and ii) a procedure for entropy extraction.
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Fig. 2. During the key enrollment phase, the Gen() takes enrolled response
r as input, and computes helper data p. The enrolled secret key sk=hash(r).
During the key regeneration phase, the Gen() takes both the regenerated
response r′ and the helper data p as inputs, and recovers the enrolled response
r. The recovered r is hashed to obtain the enrolled secret key sk.
In general, the secure sketch construction has a pair of
functions: Gen() and Rep()—see overall illustration in Fig. 2.
There are two prevalent secure sketch constructions: i) code-
offset construction; and ii) syndrome construction [23]. We
choose the later, mainly considering its security—see Sec-
tion V. During key enrollment phase, helper data p is com-
puted by using Gen(r), where p = r × HT and H is a
parity check matrix of a linear error correction code. Key
reconstruction described by Rep(r′,p)—where r′ is the repro-
duced response that may be slightly different from the enrolled
response r—first constructs a syndrome s = (r′×HT)⊕p =
e×HT, with e an error vector. Then through an error location
algorithm, e is determined. Subsequently, the response r is
recovered through r = e ⊕ r′. The recovered PUF response
r may not be uniformly distributed. Therefore, an entropy
extraction step, using a universal hash function for example, is
employed to generate a cryptographic key with full bit entropy.
In a fuzzy extractor setting, the Gen() function is performed
by the server during the enrollment phase to compute helper
data while the Rep() function is implemented on the field
deployed token. By recognizing that the computational burden
of the Rep() function is significantly more than that of Gen()
function, Van Herrewege et al. [19] placed Gen() on the
resource-constraint token while leaving the computationally
heavy Gen() function execution to the resource-rich server;
this arrangement is termed the reverse fuzzy extractor (RFE).
The (R)FE must bear two properties: i) Correctness: It
must be possible to correctly reconstruct r—equivalently, the
secret key sk—-given helper data p if the Hamming distance
between the enrolled response r and the reevaluated response
r′ is less than an acceptable threshold; and ii) Security: Given
exposed helper data p, there must be adequate residual entropy
in the PUF response r to ensure the security of the key sk.
Although the entropy extractor realized with a hash function
can be lightweight, the overhead of the secure sketch is
comparatively more dominant. This is a significant problem
PUF based key generation on a resource constrained device,
often limited by computational capability, memory, and power.
We will focus on the correct recovery in the context of
resource limited devices and a RFE where the Gen() function
is implemented on the resource limited token in Section III
and IV. We discuss security in Section V.
III. REDUCING REVERSE FUZZY EXTRACTOR OVERHEAD
A. Response Pre-Processing
The overhead of implementing the Gen() function is di-
rectly related to the response unreliability or bit error rate
(BER); noisier responses naturally require a higher error
correction overhead. Therefore, it is imperative to reduce the
expected BER of PUF responses on a token. In this context,
response pre-processing methodologies, e.g., majority voting
and reliable response pre-selection [25] can be employed.
In majority voting (MV), given q repeated response mea-
surements under an operating condition, the response value
(‘1’/‘0’) enrolled is that which shows no less than d q2e
measurements; with q an odd integer. In reliable response
pre-selection (PreSel), each PUF response under an operating
condition is repeatedly measured i times, only response bits
that exhibit 100% reliable regeneration (all ‘1’s/‘0’s) are
selected for use and enrollment—a detailed methodology with
a resource limited device is in [22].
B. Key Generation with Multiple Reference Responses
Gao et al. recently proposed the multiple reference re-
sponses (MRR) enrollment strategy [26]. This method is
especially suitable in a reverse fuzzy extractor setting to sig-
nificantly reduce the Gen() function implementation overhead
on a token [26]. The MRR rationale is described below in the
context of a reverse fuzzy extractor, dubbed MR3FE.
Fig. 3 illustrates MR3FE in the context of key generation.
During the enrollment phase, in contrast to conventional single
response enrolment under a nominal operating condition, e.g.,
room temperature of 25◦C, the server enrolls J reference
responses {r1, ..., rj , ...rJ} subject to the same challenge c
applied to the same PUF but under J different operating
conditions. We take two enrolled reference responses as an
example. As shown in Fig. 4, we assume that the server enrolls
two reference responses, r1 and r2, evaluated under 50◦C and
0◦C, respectively. We can observe in Fig. 4—regardless of
the operating condition under which the reference response is
enrolled—when the difference between the reference operating
condition at enrollment increases with respect to the condition
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Fig. 3. MR3FE in the context of key generation on token.
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Fig. 4. Bit error rate when the reference response is evaluated under:
(a) 25◦C; (b) 50◦C; and (c) 0◦C.
during a regenerated response, the the expected BER increases.
When the PUF is deployed in the field, as shown in Fig. 3,
the token reevaluates r′ corresponding to a challenge c, typi-
cally stored on chip—recall that we are using a reverse fuzzy
extractor. Then the token computes helper data p ←Gen(r′)
and generates secret key sk during run-time. The token sends
p and u ←hash(sk||p) to the server—u allows the server
to check its success of recovering sk, while also ensuring
the integrity of the helper data p to alleviate potential helper
data manipulation attacks [23], [27]. The server now attempts
to recover the response r′ based on two enrolled reference
responses: r1 and r2. For example, the server first uses r1
to restore r′′ ←Rep(r1, p). Then the server extracts a secret
key sk′ ←hash(r′′) and consequently computes verification
value u′=hash(sk′||p). If u′ = u, then it implies that the
r′′=r′, equivalently, the sk is deemed to be correctly restored.
Otherwise, sk regeneration fails based on r1. The server
continues to use reference response r2 to try to regenerate
sk. Consequently, if any of the enrolled reference responses
are capable of recovering sk, MR3FE is deemed successful
and both the token and the server are in possession of the
secret key sk.
MRR Advantages: We provide an intuitive illustration to
explain. Let us firstly assume that we use the conventional
single reference response enrolled under 25◦C as shown in
Fig. 4. We further assume that the regenerated response is
evaluated under −25◦C where the expected BER is 10% and
suppose that the helper data p is only capable of correcting
upto 6% of response errors. It is clear that the RFE using
reference response evaluated under 25◦C to recover the secret
key will most likely fail. Now given two reference responses
r1 and r2 evaluated under 50◦C and 0◦C, respectively. We can
see that r2 is more likely to be able to recover the secret key
sk even though the helper data p still has the same 6% error
correction capability because the expected BER at −25◦C
using r2 as reference is only 5%. What if the regenerated
response r′ is evaluated under 80◦C? It is not difficult to see
that now r1 is highly likely to successfully recover the secret
key sk. Although the server is unable to control the operating
condition under which the response r′ is regenerated, we can
observe that the server now has the capability of choosing
one of multiple reference responses to ensure that the chosen
reference response is close to the operating condition under
which the r′ is regenerated. This ability greatly relaxes the
error correction requirement and, thus, the implementation
overhead of the Gen() function.
C. Key Failure Rate
Our study uses the family of BCH(n, k, t) linear codes
with a syndrome based decoding strategy to realize a reverse
fuzzy extractor considering its popularity [20], [23] and its
security [23], [26], [27]. Here, n is the codeword length,
k is the code size, t is the number of errors that can be
corrected within this n-bit block. Assuming response bit errors
are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we can
express the average key failure rate of recovering an n-bit
response r′ based on a selected reference response rj , termed
as P1j , with j ∈ {1, .., J} with J the number of multiple
references employed by the server, as:
P1j = 1− FB(t;n,BERj) (1)
where BERj is the expected BER using rj as the reference
response. Here, FB() is a cumulative density function of a
binomial distribution with t successes in n Bernoulli trials,
with each trial having success probability of BERj .
A BCH(n, k, t) encoding produces (n− k)-bit helper data
that will be publicly known while the k bits contribute to
the secret. For a single BCH(n, k, t) block, the complexity
of finding the k-bit extracted key from the n-bit response r′
is 2k. It is not common to use a single large BCH(n, k, t)
block; typically a large block is split into small processing
blocks to reduce implementation complexity [28]. For k bits
of key material, response r′ can be divided into multiple non-
overlapping blocks of a BCH(n1, k1, t1) code where n1 < n
and k1 < k for a parallel implementation. Now the complexity
of finding the k bit secret is 2k1·L where L is the number of
parallel BCH(n1, k1, t1) code blocks used to realize k bits of
secret key material. Given a BCH(n1, k1, t1) code employed
to gain a security level of k bits with L = dk/k1e blocks, the
key recovery failure rate under the assumption of i.i.d code
blocks is:
P2j = 1− (1− P1j)L. (2)
When all J reference responses {r1, ..., rj , ..., rJ} are used,
r′ reconstruction fails only when all reference responses
cannot restore the response r′. We adopt a very conservative
evaluation of the key failure rate Pfail expressed as1:
Pfail = min{P2j}, j ∈ {1, ..., J} (3)
1For a detailed discussion, the reader is referred to [26].
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Fig. 5. BER when reference response is enrolled under 25◦C.
0 20 40 60 80
Temp( C)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
BE
R
0 20 40 60 80
Temp( C)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0 20 40 60 80
Temp( C)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0 20 40 60 80
Temp( C)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0 20 40 60 80
Temp( C)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
reference
@-15 C
reference
@0 C
reference
@25 C reference@40 C
reference
@80 C
Fig. 6. BER when a reference response is enrolled under different operating
conditions.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATIONS
We first test the reliability of embedded SRAM PUFs.
Then the software implementation set-up and the means
of assessing clock cycle overhead is detailed. Finally, we
implement the MR3FE PUF key generator and validate the
significant overhead reduction realized in comparison with: i)
a single reference response based FE; and ii) a single reference
response based RFE.
A. SRAM PUF Evaluation
1) SRAM PUF Dataset: The PUF CRP dataset used is
from 23 MSP430FR5969 microconrollers (MCUs) embedded
in CRFID transponders. From each MCU, we read power-up
states of 16,384 (2 KB) SRAM cells as SRAM PUF responses.
The SRAM PUF reliability is much less sensitive to voltage
variations compared with temperature fluctuations attributing
to the SRAM cell’s symmetric structure [3], [29]. Hence, we
focus on its reliability under varying temperature conditions:
−15◦C, 0◦C, 25◦C, 40◦C and 80◦C. Under each temperature
condition, each response bit is repeatedly measured 100 times.
2) Bit Error Rate: As shown in Fig. 5, for single reference
response enrollment, BER under three different enrollment
strategies are applied: one-time response measurement (none),
majority voting (MV) with 9 repeated measurements (q = 9),
and preselection (PreSel) with 10 repeated measurements. The
PreSel outperforms others.
Fig. 6 illustrates the BER when MRR are enrolled under
differing operating conditions. For the reference response
enrolled under 25◦C, preselection is applied to select reliable
responses. Then reference response under −15◦C, 0◦C, 40◦C
and 80◦C applies response majority voting on the pre-selected
reliable responses.
B. Overhead Evaluation
1) Testing Setup: The test environment used is Texas Instru-
ments’ (TI) Code Composer Studio (CCS) 7.2.0, the C code
used is downloaded to a MSP430FR5969 LaunchPad Evalua-
tion Kit via USB. TI CCS has a built-in GCC toolchain for our
hardware kit. This includes the msp430-gcc-6.4.0.32
win32 compiler. The software instructions are executed se-
quentially as advanced out-of-order execution is unavailable
for typical resource-constraint MCUs. The overhead of soft-
ware implementation is assessed in terms of clock cycles
to complete the algorithm—this is our primary evaluation
measure. We measured clock cycles using Profile Clock tool
supported in the CCS environment.
Two key components of the PUF key generator are
the hash function and the BCH code encoding/decoding—
Gen()/Rep()—blocks. Based on the hash function evaluations
in [22], we selected BLAKE2s-128 as it showed the best
performance, in term of clock cycles. As for BCH(n1, k1, t1)
code, it is imperative to use a small n1 and t1. First, the
BCH(n1, k1, t1) code overhead decreases sharply when the
codeword length n1 decreases. Second, a small t1 implies
a correspondingly large k1. With a large k1, to achieve the
security level of k-bit secret key sk, the needed number
of BCH(n1, k1, t1) blocks—L = dk/k1e—will reduce, thus,
reducing the overall overhead to gain k-bit entropy for the
secret key sk.
2) Overhead Result and Comparison:
• Fuzzy Extractor with Single Reference Response:
To achieve Pfail < 10−6, nine BCH(127,15,27) blocks
are required giving Pfail = 1.66 × 10−7 when the
single reference response under 25◦C is used. One
BCH(127,15,27) block decoding consumes 2,102,222
clock cycles. The fuzzy extractor needs to sequentially
execute BCH(127,15,27) decoding blocks 9 times and
two BLACKE2s-128 hash operations. In total, it con-
sumes up to 19,127,446 clock cycles.
• Reverse Fuzzy Extractor with Single Reference Re-
sponse: To achieve Pfail < 10−6, nine BCH(127,15,27)
blocks are required giving Pfail = 1.66× 10−7 when the
single reference response under 25◦C is used. Notably,
the token only needs to perform the encoding operation
requiring significantly less clock cycles in comparison
with decoding. One BCH(127,15,27) block encoding con-
sumes 111,335 clock cycles. This reverse fuzzy extractor
needs to sequentially execute BCH(127,15,27) encoding 9
times and two BLACKE2s-128 hash operations. In total,
it consumes up to 1,211,461 clock cycles.
• Reverse Fuzzy Extractor with Three Reference
Response: To achieve Pfail < 10−6, eight smaller
BCH(63,16,11) blocks are adequate to meet the re-
quirement with Pfail = 9.85 × 10−7. Here, 3MRR
under −15◦C, 25◦C, 80◦C are used. One BCH(63,16,11)
block encoding consumes 51,003 clock cycles. This
reverse fuzzy extractor needs to sequentially execute
BCH(63,16,11) encoding 8 times and two BLACKE2s-
128 hash operations. In total, it consumes up to 617,470
clock cycles.
We can see that the reverse fuzzy extractor is especially
suitable for resource limited devices attributing to the fact that
the Gen overhead is significantly less than the Rep overhead.
The reverse fuzzy extractor overhead is only 6.3% of the
fuzzy extractor when a single reference response is deployed
to achieve the same key failure rate performance. When the
MRR is adopted by the reverse fuzzy extractor, the clock
cycle overhead is further reduced by 49% in comparison with
a single reference response. This is because smaller n1 and
t1 code parameters—meaning less encoding overhead—-of a
BCH(n1,k1,t1) code can achieve the targeted key failure rate.
It is worth mentioning here that the server has the ability to
enroll more reference responses under fine-grained operating
conditions to further reduce the MR3FE overhead. Although
this creates a one-time burden on the server, the impact on the
token through the reduction in overhead costs is significant and
the benefits extend to the lifetime of the token in the field.
V. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Given a secure sketch with BCH(n,k,t) code, entropy leak-
age is caused mainly from the public helper data. The well-
known min-entropy loss is the n−k bound given the exposure
of helper data. This is mainly caused by the (n−k)-bit helper
data exposure. Extra entropy leakage can be from response
bias [30], [30], [31]; a bias exists when the probability of a
response being ‘1’ or ‘0’ is not ideally 50%. Active helper data
manipulation (HDM) attacks may also cause serious entropy
leakage if the helper data algorithm is not carefully con-
structed [23], [27], [32], [33]. More specifically, not all error
correction codes and decoding strategies that are components
of helper data algorithm for implementing the fuzzy extractor
are able to guarantee the security of the PUF derived key [23],
[27], therefore, when a helper data algorithm is introduced
for realizing a fuzzy extractor, not only its implementation
overhead but also its security against helper data manipulation
attacks has to be carefully evaluated. Nonetheless, Our MR3FE
case study employed BCH codes and syndrome decoding,
which has been shown to be secure under HDM attacks [27].
The reverse fuzzy extractor can result in unanticipated
entropy loss under repeated helper data exposure associated
with a given PUF response r′; unless, PUF responses are
unbiased. Generally, the extra entropy loss is a result of the
leakage of bit-specific reliability information [31]. However,
the above extra entropy losses are important only when PUF
response bias is considerably different from the ideal value
of 50% as shown by the analysis in [18], [31]. In practice,
modern silicon PUFs usually have a good bias performance—
close to 50% [3]. The bias of our tested SRAM PUF is 49.87%.
Therefore, the extra entropy loss is very small. In this context,
employing a few more response bits in the reverse fuzzy
extractor can compensate for the small extra loss in entropy.
As observed by Delvaux [18], for a PUF with low bias within
[0.42, 0.58], increasing the length of raw responses alone is an
effective measure.
If the bias is severe, entropy compensation by solely in-
creasing the length of raw responses becomes ineffective. As
a result, debiasing the biased raw responses [30] must be
undertaken first, e.g., via classic von Neumann (CVN) debias-
ing, pair-output von Neumann debiasing with erasures (-2O-
VN) and Hamming Weight (HW) based de-biasing [22]—an
example of employing a HW based debiasing method for key
derivation with a resource limited devices is detailed in [22].
Notably, not all debiasing schemes offer reusability—multiple
use of the same PUF response—for a reverse fuzzy extrac-
tor [31]. Thus, debiasing schemes, e.g., -2O-VN, that offer
reusability should be chosen for the reverse fuzzy extractor.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied a reverse fuzzy extractor based PUF key deriva-
tion method with a focus on reducing the token implemen-
tation overhead. The overhead is reduced by reducing the
response unreliability; realized by two compatible method-
ologies: i) reliable response preselection; and ii) multiple
reference response enrollment performed during the PUF
provisioning (enrollment) phase. For experiments, we used the
intrinsic SRAM PUF—requires neither hardware modification
nor extra area cost—to demonstrate a lightweight PUF key
generator implementation on a battery-less CRFID device,
followed by security analyses.
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